Uniform Working Hours: A Culprit of Structural Unemployment by Wen, Yi et al.
October 15, 2001
Uniform Working Hours:
A Culprit of Structural Unemployment
Abstract
In this paper, we construct a simple model based on heterogeneity in workers' productivity and
homogeneity in their working schedules. This simple model can generate unemployment, even if
wages adjust instantaneously, ¯rms are perfectly competitive and can perfectly observe workers'
productivity and e®ort. Unemployment in our model falls upon low-skilled workers, because ¯rms do
not ¯nd it optimal to hire low-skilled workers when working time across heterogeneous workers must
be synchronized, and low-skilled workers on the other hand do not ¯nd it attractive working for hours
the same length as of high-skilled workers at competitive wages. Our model can also explain the
stylized fact that both the number of employees and the number of hours comove with the business
cycle. (JEL classi¯cation:E 0 ,J 6 . )
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Unskilled workers are a primary source of structural unemployment. Although both skilled
and unskilled workers can be found in unemployment, it has been well documented that the
unemployment rate of unskilled workers are much higher and more sensitive to the business
cycle than that of skilled workers (e.g., Nickell and Bell, 1996; Bowlus et al., 2001).1
Previous studies generally attribute the di®erence in the unemployment rates between the
skilled and unskilled workers to the weaker labor demand of unskilled workers. However,
this interpretation depends not only on the low elasticity of substitution between skilled and
unskilled workers, but also implicitly on the assumption that wages for unskilled workers are
stickier than wages for skilled workers.
Textbook explanations for why unskilled workers are more likely to contribute to struc-
tural unemployment are also very vague and lacking genuine explanation. A typical statement
in this regard can be found in Abel and Bernanke (2001, p95):
\...unskilled or low-skilled workers often are unable to obtain desirable, long-
term jobs. The jobs available to them typically o®er relatively low wages and
little chance for training or advancement. Most directly related to the issue of
structural unemployment is the fact that jobs held by low-skilled workers often
don't last long. After a few months the job may end, or the worker may quit
or be ¯red, thus entering another spell of unemployment.... Because of factors
such as inadequate education, discrimination, and language barriers, some un-
1 Also, using the 1993 U.S. Current Population Survey March Supplement, the unemployment rate for
prime age male without ¯nishing high school is 13.86%, while the unemployment rate is only 6.24% for those
who graduated from high schools.
1skilled workers never make the transition to long-term employment and remain
chronically unemployed."
The explanation implicit in the quoted message is that low-skilled workers can ¯nd only
short-term jobs since long-term jobs require skills. According to this explanation, however,
unemployment due to the lack of skills should be characterized not as structural but fric-
tional unemployment, because if it is true that short-term jobs end more quickly and more
frequently than do long-term jobs, then the major reason for unskilled workers to be unem-
ployed is that they are more frequently forced to enter the process of job search, contributing
to frictional unemployment. This is obviously not the conclusion the authors intended to
reach in the quoted message, as chronic unemployment due to lack of skills is di®erent from
frictional unemployment due to search. This leaves the authors with the only logical con-
clusion for the higher rates of unemployment of unskilled workers: there are less short-term
jobs available than long-term jobs.
Thus, existing studies alike generally attribute, in one way or another, implicitly or
explicitly, the di®erence in the unemployment rates between the skilled and unskilled workers
to the weaker labor demand of unskilled workers, without o®ering an explicit explanation
as to why a lower demand for labor leads to a higher rate of unemployment. It is true that
unskilled workers are o®ered lower wages. But it does not explain their being unemployed.
According to the standard de¯nition of unemployment by the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
\a person is unemployed only if s/he didn't work for the past week but looked for work
during the past four weeks" (Able and Bernanke, 2001, p91). Unless wages are stickier for
the unskilled workers, equilibrium in the labor market always equates supply and demand.
2Hence a lower labor demand or a lower wage rate does not by themselves explain a higher
rate of unemployment.
Why low-skilled workers are more likely to be chronically unemployed? In this paper,
we develop a simple equilibrium model that conforms with the aforementioned facts. The
core of our model is based on the stylized fact that working hours of both skilled and low-
skilled workers are highly synchronized. For example, managers, secretaries, technicians, and
workers all work during the same hours and on the same day (say from 8:00 am to 5:00 PM
in a day and from Monday to Friday in a week).2
Costa (2000) has documented that the distribution of daily working hours are highly
compressed. For men aged 25-64, the di®erence between the 90th percentile and the 10th
percentile of the daily working hours distribution is only 2 hours in both 1973 and 1991.
Moreover, she also ¯nds that the daily working hours of median workers are the same as
those of workers at the 10th percentile in the distribution. Using the most recent 1999 US.
Current Population Survey (CPS) March Supplement ¯le, we ¯nd that only 8.45% of the
prime age (24-64) males worked less than 8 hours per day while more than 91% worked
8 hours per day or longer. In addition to biological reasons for such synchronization,3 ,
there also exist economic rationales for adopting uniform working schedule. For example,
accomplishing a task requires the coordination of many workers of di®erent skill levels during
the same period of time (think of the operation of an assembly line). Such arrangement
2 Costa (2000, p160) claims that the most common pattern of work is to begin at 8 A.M. and end at 5
P.M. from Monday to Friday.
3 For example, it is only natural that people sleep at night and work during daytime. Hence, working for
4 hours in the morning and 4 hours in the afternoon appears to be a good arrangement.
3not only reduces coordination costs but also many other sorts of ¯xed production costs.
This interpretation is consistent with Costa's (2000, p178) arguments. She claims that the
egalitarian hours distribution is the result of coordination of work activities within and across
¯rms. Moreover, Costa also points out that the synchronization of leisure-time activities
might also be the reason for the compression of daily working hours distribution.
When workers vary in their skills (productivity), highly synchronized working time has
important consequences on employment: it creates unemployment. And it turns out that
it is the low-skilled workers who is more likely to end up unemployed under synchronized
working schedules in a competitive labor market, regardless the elasticity of substitution
between skilled and unskilled workers.
Due to the heterogeneity of skills, wage rates (re°ecting a worker's marginal productivity)
di®er across workers. Suppose they share the same propensity to work, workers of di®erent
skill levels will opt to supply di®erent hours, with low-skilled workers preferring shorter hours
because of lower market wages. The synchronization of working schedule, however, requires
that all types of workers work for the same length of time, say 8 hours a day or 40 hours
per week. Low-skilled workers may therefore ¯nd the required working hours far longer than
preferred at the competitive wage rates measured by their marginal productivity. Receiving
w a g e sa b o v et h e i rm a r g i n a lp r o d u c t i v i t yf r o mp r o ¯ t - s e e k i n g¯ r m si sn o tl i k e l y .A sar e s u l t ,
unemployment will fall upon low-skilled workers as the utility they receive from working long
hours could be even lower than that without working.
Workers can also di®er in their propensities to work (preferences). Similar lines of argu-
ment can show that workers with low propensity to work will ¯nd working unattractive under
4the scheme of synchronized working hours, hence becoming unemployed.4 Thus, unskilled
workers are more likely to be unemployed than skilled workers given similar propensity to
work; and low-propensity workers are more likely to be unemployed than high propensity
workers given similar skill levels. Putting together, because of synchronized working hours,
unemployment is more likely to fall upon a low-skilled worker unless s/he has an extremely
high propensity to work.
Synchronized working scheme thus creates a dilemma: low-skilled workers would choose
to work if the wages are high enough to match their utility cost, which few ¯rms would like
to o®er since they are above the workers' marginal products. Or they could work for much
shorter hours at the market determined wages, which is impossible due to the synchronized
working schedule. Our model thus predicts that there exists a natural rate of structural
unemployment due to synchronized working hours, and that part-time jobs of various du-
ration, if available, are more likely to be occupied by unskilled workers.5 Also, it is only
natural for our model, without resorting to the notions of sticky wage or e±ciency wage, to
explain that lower demand for labor due to lower productivity is associated with higher rates
of unemployment. Our model thus has an important policy implication: a simple solution
for reducing structural unemployment is to create more part-time jobs with °exible length
4 Due to the heterogeneity of propensity to work, equilibrium wage rates will also di®er across workers.
Suppose they share the same skill level, workers of di®erent atitudes towards working will opt to supply
di®erent hours in equilibrium, with low-propensity workers prefering shorter hours because of higher utility
cost in sacrifycing leisure. Under the synchronized working schedule, however, low-prepensity workers might
¯nd that the required working hours far longer than preferred at the competetive wage rates determined by
their productivity. As a result, the utility they receive when employed is lower than that when unemployed.
5 The 1992 CPS data based on males of age 25-55 shows that in the year of 1991, among part-time workers,
24.25% are high school dropouts whereas among full-time workers that number is only 12.59%. The same
data also shows that among high school dropouts, 11.64% work as part-time workers whereas among high
school graduates that number is merely 5.32%.
5of working hours.
The arguments presented in the paper are kin to the theory of indivisible labor (Hansen,
1985; Rogerson, 1988). According to that theory, unemployment arises because people can
only choose either to work or not to work. Hence in equilibrium some individuals may be
unemployed. This theory, however, requires lottery to generate equilibrium unemployment
because of the homogeneity of workers assumed. Hence it cannot explain why it is the
low-skilled workers who are more likely to be unemployed. In our model, equilibrium unem-
ployment exists not because of indivisible labor per se { in fact working hours in our model is
in¯nitely divisible, but because of synchronization of labor across heterogenous workers. The
synchronization of labor, nevertheless, gives rise to a rigidity in the labor market similar to
that of indivisible labor, hence the theory provided in this paper can be viewed as a natural
extension of the indivisible labor theory.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section
3 proves the existence of equilibrium and derives the equilibrium unemployment rate { the
\natural rate". A calibrated numerical example is given in Section 4. The case of indivisible
labor is discussed in Section 5, and section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
There is a continuum of agents distributed in the interval i 2 [0;1];w o r k i n gf o rar e p r e s e n t a -
tive ¯rm (say, a pin factory). They have identical preferences but di®er in their skills. Let pi




6If worker i supplies ni hours of work, her contribution of output (intermediate goods) is
measured by a diminishing returns technology:
yi = pif(ni);f 0 > 0;f00 < 0; (2)
where, for simplicity, the labor's elasticity of output, ® ´
f0(N)N
f(N) ; is assumed constant. A
worker's competitive real wage is determined by her marginal product
wi = pif0(ni): (3)
However, we assume that the production technology is accessible to a worker only when
the factory is open. Output is generated only as long as the factory opens. In particular,
we assume that ¯rms in the economy are identical and act competitively, and that the
representative ¯rm's ¯nal output is an aggregation of intermediate goods but is generated





pif(minfnjg)di; nj · N and j;I 2 [0;1]; (4)
where the index I is the rate of employment for the ¯rm, and N is the factory's operation
time, both being determined by the ¯rm. The underlying rational of the aggregate technology
is that labor is productive only when all employees are present simultaneously during a time
when the factory is open. That is, coordination of workers of di®erent skills during the same
period of time is essential for the production of ¯nal output (as in Adam Smith's pin factory).
For simplicity, we have ignored the capital in the production function.
Cost minimization from the ¯rm then implies a perfect synchronization of working hours
7across employees:
ni = N; for all i · I; (5)
since spending hours longer than others do in the coordinated production process yields
zero marginal product and contributes zero added values to the ¯nal output. Thus, the




[pif(N) ¡ wiN]di; (6)
and the real wage the ¯rm pays to worker i is wi = pif0(N):
Hence, at the given wage rate wi(N), an individual i may not ¯nd the job attractive if her
utility-maximizing labor supply, ns
i(wi); is less than the required working hours, N.W h e n
that is the case, she would agree to work for N hours if she gets paid more, at a wage rate
that is higher than her marginal product, pif0(N). Since this is not optimal for the ¯rm, the
individual will not be hired, resulting in unemployment.6 Individuals with desired labor
supply greater than N are employed but can nevertheless work for N hours only.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the above idea. The upward sloping line in ¯gure 1 represents
the labor supply curve that is assumed the same across agents i 2 [0;1]: The downward
sloping lines represent labor demand curves for agents with di®erent productivity levels.
The demand for labor is obviously weaker for lower-productivity workers at any given wage
rates. As long as working hours are not required to be synchronized across agents, however,
6 Without loss of generality and to simplify the analysis, we assume that staying unemployed receives
higher utility than working for hours longer than preferred. This assumption can be easily relaxed without
a®ecting the major insights generated (see section 5). We also assume that \part-time" jobs with hours
shorter than N are not available in the model. In reality, although part-time jobs do exist, they are not set
for arbitrary length of hours. Namely, there still exists synchronized minimum hours people are required to
work for part-time jobs. Hence, the major insights of the model still apply to these situations.
8competitive equilibrium implies that all agents are employed regardless of their skill levels.
Consequently, in equilibrium workers di®er only in their working hours and wage rates, not
in their employment status. In ¯gure 1, agent i0 works for n0 hours, agent I works for N
hours, and agent i1 works for n1 hours, etc.
Synchronization of labor, however, implies that workers cannot work for any arbitrary
hours stipulated by their desired labor supply at the competitive wage rates. They must
either work for the same length of time as the others do or not to work at all. Consequently,
at any given uniform working hours, there may exist unemployment. For example, ¯gure 2
shows that agent i0 is unemployed as her labor supply curve intersects with her corresponding
labor demand curve at a location that is below the synchronized working hours N.A t
the required working hours (N), agent i0
0s utility cost of working (w) is larger than the
competitive real wage she receives (i.e., w0). In fact, all workers with indices nearby i0 can
a®ord working for only \part-time" jobs (with hours less than N)a tt h ec o m p e t i t i v ew a g e
rates measured by their marginal products, although they are certainly interested in (or
looking for) \full-time" jobs that can pay them wages that match their disutility of working.
Hence they satisfy the de¯nition of unemployment given by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Only agents such as I and i1 are employed workers, where I is also the optimal cut-o®
point to be determined by pro¯t-seeking ¯rms when choosing the synchronized hours N.
The competitive real wages paid to the employed workers obviously di®er among them due
to heterogeneity in productivity. Some of them (say agent i1) may ¯nd the wage rates (e.g.,
w1) so attractive (as it is far above their marginal disutility of working) that they are willing
to supply hours much longer than N but can nevertheless work only for N hours. In fact, all
9employed workers except the cut-o® type (I) work for wage rates above their labor supply
curve.
Note that the wages paid to the employed workers are also higher than their respective
market-clearing levels. For example, agent i1 receives real wage w1 from the representative
¯rm while her market-cleaning real wage (determined by supply and demand of labor with
respect to all type i1 agents in the economy) is between w1 and w: The cut-o® agent I is
the only exception, with her received real wage (w) just equal to her respective market-
cleaning level (w). This phenominon that received wages are above market cleaning levels
are reminiscent of the e±ciency-wage literature (see Yellen, 1984, Katz, 1986, and Akerlof
and Yellen, 1986 for surveys and references), although arising for entirely di®erent reasons.
In our model, equilibrium wage rates are higher than market clearing levels for high-skilled
workers because solely of the synchronization of working hours across agents, not because of
any incentive problems due to unobservable work e®ort or productivity. Similarly, the low-
skilled workers are unemployed in our model not because of a low elasticity of substitution
between high-skilled and low-skilled workers, or of a weaker labor demand for low-skilled
w o r k e r s ,b u ts o l e l yb e c a u s eo ft h es y n c h r o n i z a t i o ni nw o r k i n gh o u r st h a tr e s u l t si nw a g e s
paid to low-skilled workers (e.g., w0) being below their least acceptable levels (i.e., w).
Whether unemployment in this model is \voluntary" or \involuntary" depends thus
purely on the points of view. It is voluntary in the sense that low-productivity workers
(such as those represented by i0) refuse to take a job working for N hours and being paid at
the competitive wage, w0, which is below their disutility of working (w). It is involuntary in
the sense that ¯rms refuse to hire them at the asking wage (w) or market prevailing wages.7
103 Equilibrium
In this section, we prove the existence of equilibrium, derive the equilibrium rate of unem-
ployment, and conduct comparative statics with respect to changes in technology parameters.
Proposition 1 If the supply of labor is an increasing function of the real wage (upward
sloping), then for any given uniform working hours N>0; there exists a cut-o® point I(N),
such that worker i is unemployed if i>I (N); a n de m p l o y e di fi · I(N):
Proof. Let wi(ns) be the inverse labor supply function of worker i: Since the cut-o® worker
I0s labor supply is exactly the same as her labor demand, we have:
pIf0(N)=wI(N); (7)
where wI(N) is the inverse labor supply function for agent I. Equation (7) determines the
cut-o® worker's productivity as a function of the synchronized working hours N :
pI = wI(N)=f0(N);f 0(N) > 0: (8)
Since productivity pi is indexed by i; the cut-o® point I(N) is also determined. ¥
For employed workers with i<I (N); the real wage is determined by
pif0(N) >w I(N); (9)
and their equilibrium labor supply given by ns
i = N: And for the unemployed workers with
i>I(N); their equilibrium labor supply is zero.
7 By de¯nition, a worker is said to be \involuntarily unemployed" if she is willing to work at the market-
prevailing wage but cannot ¯nd a job. In our model, the market-prevailing wages are the wage rates paid to
the employed workers (e.g., anywhere between w and w1): Since the market-prevailing wage rates are above
the unemployed workers' marginal products, these workers cannot ¯nd jobs.
11The cut-o® point, I(N); measures the rate of employment given N. It is a decreasing
function of the synchronized working hours N since equation (4) implies that the cut-o®
worker's productivity p is increasing in N. The intuition is that only higher-productivity
workers are willing to work for longer hours at the competitive wage rates, consequently less
people are attracted to work as the working hours increase.
Proposition 2 De¯ne the cumulative product index as P(N) ´
R I(N)
i=0 pidi ¸ 0; the elasticity
of the cumulative product with respect to the factory operation time N as "(N) ´
P0(N)N
P(N) ,
and the elasticity of a worker's output with respect to hours as ® ´
f0(N)N
f(N) : Assuming that ®
is constant. An optimal synchronization time N¤ exists and is determined by the condition:
¡"(N)=®: (10)










where the cut-o® point I(N) is determined by (4), and ® 2 (0;1] is the constant output
elasticity of hours.8 Using the de¯nition for the cumulative productivity index, P; the pro¯t
maximization program can then be rewritten as
max
N
¦=( 1¡ ®)f(N)P(N): (12)
Without loss of generality, assuming f(N)=0f o rN =0a n dI(N)=0f o rN ¸ M<1:
Since the pro¯t function is non-negative over the domain N 2 R+ and it takes zero values at
the two points, N = f0;Mg; a maximum therefore exists in the open interval N 2 (0;M):
This proves the existence of N¤: The necessary condition for optima is given by
f0(N)P(N)+f(N)P0(N)=0 ; (13)









or ® = ¡"(N):¥
This optimal condition says that, given that the ¯rm must choose an uniform working
hours (N) across all types of agents with di®erent skill levels, N should be chosen at the
point where the elasticity of cumulative product with respect to hours (the percentage loss
of aggregate output due to the loss of the number of employees as working hours increase)
is equal to the elasticity of individual output (the percentage gain in individual's production
as working hours increase).
To understand this condition, notice that the pro¯t function, ¦ = (1 ¡ ®)f(N)P(N),
is a combination of output due to per-worker quantity (f(N)) and an index of aggregate
quantity (P) of all employees. The quantity per worker increases with hours worked per
person (f0(N) > 0): The aggregate quantity of all employees (P), however, decreases with
hours worked per person because longer uniform working hours imply that fewer workers are
employed under competitive real wages, hence the aggregate product index, P =
R I
i=0 pidi;
decreases. (Note P0(N)=P0(I)I0(N) < 0s i n c eI0(N) < 0). Increasing working hours in the




where the ¯rst terms measures the marginal gain given the number of employees, and the
second term measures the marginal loss due to a reduction in the rate of employment as
working hours increase.
13Proposition 3 If P00N
P0 > ¡(1 + ®); then the equilibrium is unique.
Proof. Di®erentiating equation (13) again gives
d2¦
dNdN


















f0 = ® ¡ 1; P0N













< 0( 1 7 )
if and only if P00N
P0 > ¡(1 + ®): ¥
The intuition for the condition, P00N
P0 > ¡(1 + ®), is that we require that the loss of
cumulative product due to the loss of low-skilled workers caused by an increase in the uniform
working hours do not accelerate too fast when N increases, meaning that the cut-o® function
I does not decrease too fast as N increases, or that the inverse labor supply curve in ¯gure
1 is not too steep. Suppose that the condition fails to hold, e.g., the inverse labor supply
curve in ¯gure 1 is vertical, then we can imagine multiple or even a continuum of equilibria
for the cut-o® function I:
The optimal rate of employment is then given by I(N¤), in which N¤ solve equation (10).
A \natural" rate of unemployment in the economy can then be de¯ned as
UNR =1¡ I(N¤); (18)
which depends on both preferences and technology parameters.
The following two propositions establish the direction of changes in both I and N when
technology parameters change. For that purpose, we introduce an aggregate technology
14shifter A into the workers' production function:
yi = Apif(ni); (19)





Note that the cut-o® condition implies that I is decreasing in N and that @I





dA > 0 if @2P
@I@I · 0. Namely, the response of N to changes in the aggregate
technology level is positive if the cumulative product index P is non-convex in I.
Proof. Rewrite the ¯rst-order condition (10) as
®P(N;A)=¡PN(N;A)N(A): (21)

































> 0( P r o p o s i t i o n3 ) . W e
also know that PN < 0s i n c ePN = ¡® P
N as in (21). Hence,
dN
dA
> 0i f®PA + PNAN>0: (24)
15But we know that PA = @P
@I
@I
@A > 0; where @P
@I > 0a n d @I
@A > 0s i n c et h ec u t - o ®w o r k e r ' s
poductivity p in (20) is decreasing in A holding N constant. Therefore, we require only































denote it as PIIIAIN + PIINA,i nw h i c hw ek n o wIAIN < 0s i n c e @I
@A > 0a n d @I
@N < 0;
and we also know PIINA > 0s i n c e@P











p is the cut-o® worker's productivity satisfying
@2p
@N@A < 0 (see equation 20). Therefore,
PNA = PIIIAIN + PIINA > 0i fPII · 0: ¥
This proposition is intuitive since a higher A raises each worker's productivity. However,
if the second-order condition, PII · 0, is not satis¯ed, then it is possible for N to decrease in
response to an increase in A, because in that case ¯rm opt to increase the number of workers
(I)b ys om u c he v e nt or e d u c eh o u r sw o r k e d .
Proposition 5 dI









where "w > 0 is the wage elasticity of labor supply.









































dI < 0; the requirement dI








































f0 = ® ¡ 1: ¥
This proposition says that the rate of employment can also positively respond to the
aggregate technology shock A simultaneously with N if the supply of hours is su±ciently
elastic ("w small). The intuition is that a higher aggregate technology raises the low-skilled
workers' productivity, resulting in a higher rate of employment for the low-skilled workers,
provided that the corresponding increase in hours is not too big to curtail the positive
technology e®ect on employment rate. This would be the case if the inverse labor supply
curve is su±ciently °at or ® is su±ciently large so that the cut-o® function I is less sensitive
to changes in hours.
4 A Speci¯c Example
Consider a parameterized model economy. Let N be the uniform working hours, and let the
per-worker production function be given by yi = ApiN®; where A represents an aggregate
productivity shifter. In addition, let the productivity parameter of individual i follow pi =
1 ¡ i;i 2 [0;1]; and the inverse labor supply function be given by
w = °0 + °1N: (31)
17Suppose the cut-o® point for worker's type is I,t h e nw o r k e r sw i t hi · I will be employed
at wage rates wi = ®ApiN®¡1; and workers with i>Iwill be unemployed. Given N; the
cut-o® point I is determined by condition (20):






Each employed worker (i · I) receives the real wage wi = ®A(1 ¡ i)N®¡1; which is greater
than the cut-o® worker's real wage by the factor 1¡i
1¡I ¸ 1:









where I is given in (33). The ¯rst order condition (equation 10) is




where "w > 0 is the elasticity of wage with respect to hours supply: w0N
w :












18It is easy to see that the rate of employment (I) and hours worked (N) comove together
in response to aggregate technology shocks A, regardless of ®: Di®erentiate both sides of
















2 > 0: Hence the direction of changes in I
is the same as the direction of changes in N regardless of ®. For this reason, we can assume
® = 1 without loss of generality, so as to gain further insight on the comovement of I and














;° 0 · A: (40)




















0 +3 A2 > 0: (42)
It is a well documented stylized fact in the business cycle literature that both the rate
of employment and hours worked are procyclical (e.g., see Cho and Cooley, 1994). This is
consistent with the predictions of our model. A lower period of aggregate productivity induces
pro¯t-seeking ¯rms to adjust downward both the number of employees and the number of
9 The ¯rm's pro¯t is zero when the technology is linear. In that case, the total revenue rather than the
total pro¯t is being maximized.
19hours worked per person. Since it is the low-skilled workers who are exposed to the layo® risk
when employment rate decreases, the unemployment rate of low skilled workers is therefore
more sensitive to the business cycle than that of skilled workers.
The relative magnitude of adjustment in the two di®erent margins (number of workers
and number of hours) in response to aggregate disturbances depend crucially on the slope of













A °atter labor supply curve (a larger °1) or a lower propensity to work (a larger °0)i m p l i e s
more volatile employment rate relative to hours worked during the business cycle. Given
the status quo of the labor supply curve, however, a lower level of aggregate productivity
implies relatively smaller reactions from hours worked to business cycle shocks than that from
employment rate. This prediction is interesting as it indicates that developed economies
would have a higher volatility in hours worked but a lower volatility in employment rate
than underdeveloped economies, as the impact of technology shocks being mostly absorbed
by hours worked in economies where aggregate productivity level is high.
Another interesting case to consider is the relationship between I and ®: To facilitate the






The equilibrium employment rate is thus a decreasing function of the technology parameter
®. Notice that ® measures not only the labor's elasticity of output for an individual worker,
but also the elasticity of substitution between skilled and low-skilled workers as is clear from
20the aggregate production function (4).
Previous studies attribute the higher rate of unemployment of low-skilled workers to a
low elasticity of substitution between high-skilled and low-skilled workers. Such conventional
interpretations make sense only if hours worked are not synchronized so that workers with
di®erent skill levels can work for di®erent hours. Pro¯t maximization would then induce
¯rms to replace high-skilled workers with low-skilled workers so as to cut down wage costs,
if the elasticity of substitution between these di®erent types of workers is high.
Equation (44) indicates, however, that such intuitions are not necessarily correct when
working time is synchronized across workers of all skills. We see here that unemployment of
low-skilled workers increases as the elasticity of substitution between high-skilled and low-
skilled workers increases. This is so because when low-productivity workers are no longer
essential in the synchronized production process such that their work can be substituted
out (replaced) by high-productivity workers, pro¯t maximization would induce the ¯rm to
extend working hours to further utilize the productivity of high-skilled workers, resulting in
higher rate of unemployment (as the low-skilled workers cannot a®ord working for hours the
same length as the high-skilled workers).
The Case of Indivisible Labor { In the above discussions, we have considered synchronized
working schedule due solely to cost minimization from the ¯rm side. But synchronization of
working hours can also be due to biological reasons (e.g., it is only natural for human body
to sleep during night and work during day). Suppose that for biological reasons only two
discrete choices of hours exist: either working for ¹ N hours not to work at all. What are the
consequences of indivisible labor on employment when workers are heterogenous in their skill
21levels?








N = f0; ^ Ng: (46)
The solution is obviously N = ^ N; since the pro¯t is zero when N =0 : Hence equation (20)
or (33) su±ce for determining the equilibrium level of employment in the model, which is










;° 0 <A : (47)
Note that both the aggregate technology (A) and the length of working hours ( ^ N)a ® e c tt h e
equilibrium rate of employment. Since hours are indivisible, adjustment of output in response
to aggregate technology shock (A) falls entirely upon the rate of employment I.I np a r t i c u l a r ,
the employment rate decreases as A decreases. Again, in this model, unemployment falls
upon the low-skilled workers, not because of a low elasticity of substitution between skilled
and unskilled labor, but because of synchronization of labor. Obviously, the model cannot
explain why hours also respond to business cycle disturbances. It is hence more likely that
both biological factors, institutional factors, and production coordination all play a role
in synchronizing people's working schedules. For example, biological or institutional factors
allows people to work for 8 hours per day and 40 hours per week on average, but for reasons of
production coordination and pro¯t maximization, ¯rms can adjust the actual working hours
up or down (say between 35 and 45 hours per week) in response to business conditions.
225R o b u s t n e s s
In this section, we prove that explicitly taking into account workers' utility function in
determining their labor supply behavior does not alter our conclusions reached in the paper,
as long as the utility function is consistent with an upward-sloping labor supply curve (i.e.,
the substitution e®ect dominates the income e®ect). The crucial thing to check is that
such consideration does not a®ect the main features of the cut-o® function (I)w h i c hw a s
determined previously by the condition:
pIf0(N)=wI(N); (48)
where the right hand side is the real wage determined by the marginal product, and the
left-hand side is the worker's inverse labor supply function. There are two major properties
implied by this condition and were used in the paper to prove propositions (2)-(5). The
¯rst property is that
dpI
dN > 0; which also implies dI
dN < 0s i n c epI is decreasing in I: The
second property is that the cumulative productivity index, P ´
R I(N)
i=0 pidi; is decreasing in
N : dP
dN > 0: This is a natural consequence of dI
dN < 0:
Let the index number that solves condition (48) be I1: The assumption behind condition
(48) for being a marginal condition is that workers are better o® by not working than working
for any hours longer than desired. We show here that relaxing this assumption does not
change anything qualitatively except that the newly determine cut-o® point ( call it I2)l i e s
above the original cut-o® point determined from (48), I1. The intuition for I2 >I 1 is that
workers with indices immediately above I1 (i.e., their labor demand curves lie immediately
below worker I1) may still ¯nd working for N hours more attractive than not working at
23all, although N exceeds their desired labor supply. Workers with indices i>I 2; however,
de¯nitely ¯nd working not attractive as the utility received from working for N hours is less
than that from not working at all.
Consider the utility function for worker i 2 [0;1] :
u(ci;1 ¡ ni)=u(° + wini;1 ¡ ni);u 0
1;u 0
2 > 0;u 00
1;u 00
2 < 0; (49)
where ci = °+wini is consumption, wi is the real wage, ni is the hours worked, 1 is the time




= u1¡n(ci;n i); (50)
or
uc (° + wini;1 ¡ n)w = u1¡n (° + wini;1 ¡ n): (51)
Let wi = pif0(ni);i= I1; and ni = N; (51) becomes exactly the condition (48) which was
used to determine the cut-o® point I1 in the paper, provided that the inverse labor supply
function w(ni) as an implicit solution to (51) exists and is unique. But (51) is no longer the
right condition for determining the cut-o® point in the current case, as workers with i>I 1
may still prefer working to not working. The right condition is given by
u
¡
° + pif0(N)N;1 ¡ N
¢
¸ u(°;1): (52)
Namely, facing the synchronized working hours N; the individual will choose to work if and
only if the utility received from working for N hours exceeds the utility of not working at
all. Hence, a cut-o® point I2(N) exists and is determined implicitly by the equation,
u
¡
° + pI2f0(N)N;1 ¡ N
¢
= u(°;1): (53)








<u 1¡n(c;N); if i>I 1;( 5 5 )
namely, for a worker i (· I1) whose desired labor supply is greater than that of the marginal
worker I1 which is determined by (51), increasing her working hours beyond N increases her
utility; and for a worker (i>I 1) whose desired labor supply is less than that of the marginal
worker I1; increasing her working hours beyond N decreases her utility.





Now totally di®erentiating the cut-o® equation (53) with respect to N; realizing that I =









= u1¡N (cI2;N): (57)








This completes the proof.10
10 The other property implied by (21) and was used to prove propositions (4) and (5),
@I
@A > 0; is easy to
check from (23).
25Figure 3 illustrates the idea fully, where agent I1 has desired labor supply just equal to
her labor demand at N; but no longer determines the cut-o® employment rate. The cut-o®
employment rate is determined instead by agent I2 who is just indi®erent between working
for N hours and not working at all.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we proposed a model to explain the structural unemployment, without resorting
to conventional labor-market frictions such as sticky wages and imperfect information on
workers' productivity. The model is built on two commonly observed facts. First, working
schedules are highly synchronized across labor. For example, in the 1890s, about 47% of male
workers in the US. worked 10 hours per day and \the most common pattern was for work
t ob e g i na t7 : 0 0A . M ,a n de n da t5 : 3 0P . M .w i t ha3 0 - m i n u t eb r e a kf o rl u n c h( C o s t a2 0 0 0 ,
p159)." One hundred years later, the degree of synchronization had become even stronger.
In 1991, 57% of male workers in the US. reported that they worked 8 hours per day, and
the most common pattern was from 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. (Costa 2000, p160). The other
observation is that workers are heterogeneous in their skill levels, some are more productive
than others even in the same department working on similar tasks. Di®erence in productivity
implies di®erence in wages, which in turn implies di®erence in hours supply. Synchronization
of labor, however, requires the same working hours.
As a result, unskilled workers are unemployed and the unemployment rate of low-skilled
workers is expected to be higher than that of the skilled workers. The intuition is that the
8 hours per day schedule is too long for the unskilled workers at a wage rate measured by
26marginal productivity. Consequently, unskilled workers ¯nd such jobs unattractive on the
one hand (even though they might ¯nd the wage rate attractive at shorter hours), and ¯rms
do not ¯nd it optimal on the other hand to hire them (at wages su±cing for compensating
their disutility of working).
Our analyses showed that that the rate of employment and the average hours worked
per worker can both respond to business cycle shocks and can do so in the same direction.
During economic booms due to positive aggregate technology shocks, not only the average
working hours (synchronized across workers) are longer, but more people also are absorbed
into the work force from the low tail of the skill spectrum. The converse is also true during
economic recessions. As a result, low-skilled workers are more sensitive to the business cycle
t h a ns k i l l e dw o r k e r s ,a si so b s e r v e di nt h eU Se c o n o m y .
Since the rate of employment negatively depends on the length of working hours, regard-
less labor being indivisible or not, an obvious policy implication of the models examined in
this paper is that reducing working hours can boost employment, other things equal. The
reason is that more low-skilled workers are able to ¯nd jobs when the working time shortens.
French government, for example, has been pushing for a 35-hour work week against the tra-
ditional 40-hour work week in an attempt to reduce unemployment. The welfare gain of such
policy, however, is not clear, since a shorter working time could also cause loss of aggregate
output, especially with respect to the high productivity workers. To carefully evaluate the
welfare consequence of adopting shorter working week in an environment like ours from a
social point of view is a task we want to push in future works.
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28Figure 1. Labor market equilibrium when hours are not synchronized, where agent i0 works
for n0 hours, agent I works for N hours, and agent i1 works for n1 hours.
29Figure 2. Labor market equilibrium when hours are synchronized at N, where worker i0 is
unemployed, worker i1 is employed, and worker I is the cut-o® type.
30Figure 3. Labor market equilibrium when hours are synchronized, where worker i0 is
unemployed, workers I1 and i1 are employed, and worker I2 is the cut-o® type.
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